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This chapter offers an account of cooperation
between Mexico and the US around labor issues
from 1994, when the NAFTA labor side agreement
first made labor issues relevant to US-Mexico
foreign relations, to the present, where that
cooperation has broken down substantially. I
argue that while the NAFTA labor side accord
features
strong
institutions
created
to
reinforce trilateral cooperation on labor
issues, the weak resolutions across NAALC
cases and the breakdown of labor cooperation
across these and other channels show that
institutional frameworks are not enough to
promote cooperation in North America if
commitment to labor cooperation and a strong
policy direction do not complement institution
building.
Mexican-US relations in the area of labor cooperation have
become an important aspect of the binational agenda, mostly
due to the effect that the NAFTA agreement has had on
strengthening
US-Mexico
relations
in
general.
Labor
cooperation has also become more important over time as the
relationship
has
been
channeled
through
the
NAFTA
institutions that were set up to promote labor issues.
However, in recent years, formal channels of labor
cooperation-- meetings between the representatives of these
respective governments—have broken down considerably.
In this chapter, I offer an account of how the formal
channels for labor cooperation between the US and Mexico
have evolved, and offer a panorama of the scope and content
of
US-Mexico
labor
cooperation
since
1994,
based
principally on a review of the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (NAALC), NAFTA’s side accord on labor.
Unlike in other areas of cooperation in North America,
labor issues potentially benefit from a range of new
institutions established by NAFTA to open channels of
communication at all levels of government between the NAFTA
countries, as well as a unique labor dispute resolution
mechanism that reveals common labor violations, encouraging
states to collaborate to strengthen labor protections for
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the workers of North America. Yet, I argue that while the
NAFTA labor side accord thus features an number of
institutions created to reinforce trilateral cooperation,
the weak resolutions across NAALC cases and the breakdown
of labor cooperation across these channels show that an
institutional
framework
is
not
enough
to
promote
cooperation in North America. Rather, the absence of policy
direction in the NAALC has meant that the framework of the
side agreement has been adapted by member states to avoid
labor cooperation, leading to an important breakdown in
these channels of collaboration in recent years. As such,
this contribution to the edited volume shows that
institutions may be necessary, but are not a sufficient by
themselves to promote cooperation among the states in North
America.
Early Efforts at Cooperation on US-Mexico Labor Issues
Formal channels of US-Mexico cooperation on labor issues
date from meetings of the Mexico-United States Binational
Commission, the most important forum for high-level
dialogue between the executives of both states (Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores n.d.), which by 1989 included
representatives from the Ministries of Labor. Labor issues
would become more salient the next year as the Mexicans
approached the US delegation at the World Economic Forum
and asked them to consider a trade deal (Cameron and Tomlin
2000).
Once Canada was to be included, and all three
states publicly declared an intention to negotiate what
would eventually become the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), labor issues took on a new importance in
North America.
First, initial discussions on the trade deal imagined labor
mobility within North America, an idea quickly scrapped but
since taken up again in recent discussions on reopening the
NAFTA agreements (Viano 2010). Even without EU-style
integrated labor markets, it is clear that labor is no
longer a bordered phenomenon in some productive sectors in
North America, while access to labor arbitration remains
largely rooted in domestic processes. With a set of
supranational standards and institutions, workers who
experienced violations of their rights could apply for
redress regardless of where the violations took place, and
without regard to their national status.
Second, the US
and Canada both have mature industrial relations systems
and efficient labor law enforcement mechanisms, but while
Mexico’s labor laws may have been the most progressive of
the three, enforcement was and remains problematic. Given
these asymmetries, US policymakers worried that a trade
agreement may draw US businesses to Mexico, where labor
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As the NAFTA negotiations wore on, it became clear that the
trade accord would have to address labor issues in order to
pass Congressional ratification in the United States.
Democratic legislators, responding to union’s concerns that
trade integration would pull jobs from the US to Mexico,
and worried that weaker labor regulations in Mexico would
then create pressures to weaken regulations in the US,
lobbied for the inclusion of labor guarantees to the
negotiation agenda (Hafner-Burton 2009). As such, the
Democrats tied fast track negotiation authority to the
inclusion of labor protections in the trade accord. After
six rounds that threatened at times to upend the entire
negotiation (Cameron and Tomlin 2000), an agreement was
reached on the labor and environmental side accords in
August of 1993, and signed in September.
The NAALC Institutions
Instead of developing new regional labor standards, as most
of the groups that opposed NAFTA had wanted, the labor side
agreement only obliges the three nations to "effectively
enforce" their own national labor laws (Compa 2001;
International Labor Rights Fund 1995).1 What the NAALC
accord does contribute to the protection of labor rights in
North America is a set of new institutions dedicated to the
arbitration and resolution of violations of NAFTA’s labor
rights principles. The agreement establishes a National
Administrative Office (NAO) in each state to oversee the
process of filing cases for dispute resolution, and these
are the national offices that receive labor rights
petitions.2 The NAALC also established new formal channels
for trinational cooperation and coordination around labor
rights issues in all three states. The Commission for Labor
Cooperation (CLC) includes a tri-national Secretariat that
assists the NAOs and the three labor ministers in

1

The NAALC agreement mentions 11 labor rights principles, including
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining,
health and occupational safety, discrimination at work, technical
labor standards (including wages and hours), and the rights of
migrant workers, which largely mirror the labor rights enumerated in
the International Labor Organization’s 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
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In the US, the NAO is now known as the Office of Trade and Labor
Affairs (OTLA). I will refer to it as the US NAO to stay consistent
with the parallel institutions in Mexico and Canada.
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administering the activities associated with the NAALC.3 As
such, the NAALC process, and the institutions associated
with the parallel accord have also served to strengthen and
institutionalize contact between US and Mexican labor
officials in a manner that has been constant, and at times,
fruitful, for promoting labor rights protection in both
countries.
Labor Dispute Resolution
The NAALC agreement also establishes a unique dispute
resolution procedure for labor issues that is unrelated to
the dispute provisions for investment or trade and
commerce, and which allows individuals to bring cases
against states under the terms of the agreement. During the
arbitration process, any citizen or group can file a
complaint with an NAO regarding the target state's
performance on labor law enforcement. Once a case is filed
alleging violations of any of these principles, the NAO has
the option to review the complaint further or not. If a
review is granted, the NAO then researches the allegations,
attempts to verify them through discussions with the NAO in
the state where the violation took place, and most
importantly,
assesses
whether
such
violations
are
consistent with national labor law in the state in
question. The NAO then makes a public report on how issues
raised in the case could be addressed.
Through 2010, 41 petitions have been filed regarding labor
rights violations in 36 separate cases, with 26 total
Of the forty-one
petitions filed against Mexico.4
petitions submitted to date, 27, or just over 66% of the
petitions filed have been accepted for review, the second
step in the arbitration process. However, the highest level
of resolution for any case to date has been Ministerial
Consultations, which are meetings between the labor
ministers. These are generally discussions about labor
rights issues raised in the case, and often result in
Ministerial Agreements, official pronouncements on what
states might do to resolve recurrent labor rights
violations, including the cooperative activities and public
outreach programs that are then overseen by the CLC. The
fact that most cases in the NAALC have ended in promises
between governments to talk about labor issues rather than
3

4

Since 1994, the commission has coordinated 69 cooperative activities,
54 of which were held in Mexico, regarding labor issues in North
America. These activities have ranged widely, from seminars on
health and safety issues, to conferences about Mexico’s labor
justice system, to worker outreach regarding the rights of women
workers and agricultural workers.
Two cases have been filed on Canada and 13 against the United States.
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resolve them at the plant level has been one of the points
of contention for critics of the NAALC, who charge that the
NAALC is “toothless” because it doesn’t go far enough on
punishing labor rights violations (Collingsworth 1996;
Bensusán 2002; Singh 2002; Singh and Adams 2001). Still
others note that the NAALC institutions were designed to
not have strong regulatory power (Weiss 2003; Buchanan and
Chaparro 2008), and therefore do not have the enforcement
capacity that early challengers to NAFTA wanted.5 Given
that the NAALC thus far has not been able to award the
types of resolutions that filing groups wanted, a number of
groups have turned away from the process altogether in
recent years, leading to a decline in cases filed and
reviewed, but also a breakdown in cooperative activities
promoted by the CLC.6
The Recent Breakdown in Binational Labor Cooperation
Labor cooperation in North America has been further
challenged by the politicization of the Department of Labor
in the United States under the Bush Administration (20012009). As such, after the 2000 election, the administration
moved to isolate the Department of Labor and reverse the
initiatives begun under the relatively pro-labor Clinton
administration. The appointment of Republican officials
that were hostile to labor into administrative positions in
the Department of Labor, the reorganization of the
international wing where the NAO is housed (the Bureau
International Labor Affairs, ILAB), and cuts in funding to
international labor rights programs during this period all
in turn limited the ways that the US Department of Labor
could
addressed
labor
violations,
including
through
international efforts like the NAALC.
With the US suddenly not interested in pursuing labor
cooperation further, Mexico was then better able to
reassert its own lack of interest in developing the NAALC,
creating a new, more defensive position vis-à-vis the US
This in turn created new barriers to communication
NAO.7
between the NAOs that caused friction in the relationship,
and limited the ways that the US NAO could engage their
5
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One example might be that most of the petitions, 29 of the total 41,
feature freedom of association as the main violation, signaling that
freedom of association violations are a major problem in North
America, but it is these cases are not eligible for higher levels of
resolution beyond Ministerial Consultations, including trade
sanctions.
The CLC office was closed in August of 2010.
For example, Mexico took on a highly legalistic interpretation of
their responsibilities under the NAALC, refusing to participate with
the US NAO except for those activities and communication channels
that were explicitly noted in the text of the NAALC agreement.
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Mexican counterparts. The overall impact that the defensive
position has left in the US is the perception that the
Mexicans are no longer willing to cooperate on labor
issues. The fact that the Mexican NAO has refused to
participate in cooperative activities around even migrant
labor issues, the singular labor issue that is important to
them, only adds to the image that the Mexicans have become
obstinate.
This discussion of NAFTA’s labor side agreement underlines
that compared to other issue areas, labor cooperation is
one aspect of North American integration that is highly
legalized, with a deep range of institutions. Yet, the
institutionalization of labor cooperation has not been
enough to assure cooperation in North America, much less
the protection of labor rights. The creation of state-level
labor offices, a trinational commission, regular meetings
between high level officials, and continuous trilateral
communication through the channels established by the side
agreement have all largely failed to either strengthen
labor protections, or maintain and deepen cooperation on
North American labor regulation. What is left is a
piecemeal approach to labor adjudication driven by the
NAALC cases that in turn is subject to cross-cutting
political interests in all three states. As the discussion
on the politicization of the Department of Labor makes
clear, the NAALC process over the last 10 years has been
largely driven in by an interest in undermining the NAALC
process, not strengthening it.8 While the inclusion of the
labor side agreement to the trade accord made labor issues
a solid part of the trilateral agenda, institutional
channels for cooperation are shown here to mean little
without a strong policy direction.
Conclusions
While labor issues have always been overshadowed by more
pressing concerns between Mexico, the US, and Canada, after
NAFTA,
labor
became
a
constant
part
of
bilateral
cooperation. On one hand, the NAALC established formal
institutions and channels of communication for labor
representatives, while on the other, the NAALC case process
promoted cross-border mobilization between members of civil
society in the US, Mexico and Canada. In turn, these
channels of communication have formed the basis for better

8

The seemingly pro-labor agenda of the Obama administration remains
agnostic on this point. Though there is a backlog of cases to
resolve, and new cases under the CAFTA-DR and NAFTA agreements, the
US NAO has not made an effort to reverse the inertia left by the
leadership of Elaine Chao.
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Nonetheless, the path that labor cooperation has taken
since NAFTA can provide some lessons on how the larger
bilateral relationship could be nurtured and sustained.
First, the structure of cooperation under the NAALC
necessarily
demanded
constant
contact
between
labor
bureaucrats as the NAOs interacted to ask questions,
solicit information and determine overall what should be
done with each of the petitions that the NAO offices
received. In turn, staff members developed a comfortable
rapport with their counterparts that reinforced the
cooperative spirit of the agreement, and kept the NAALC
In
turn,
the
process
from
becoming
adversarial.9
cooperative spirit of the agreement set the tone for the
wide range of activities of the CLC, which in the end,
remains a core achievement of the agreement.
However, the fallout after the politicization of the
Department of Labor after 2001 shows that the bilateral
relationship between Mexico and the United States –the
major players in the NAALC accord-- needs to be actively
supported. When the US NAO became embroiled in the
politicization of the Department of Labor, the Mexican NAO
then also withdrew from the NAALC process, in part because
the US was no longer pushing them to participate. This in
turn had an important effect on how the NAALC institutions
functioned, as once they were neglected, petition sponsors
then turned away from the process as well. Once subject to
political interests within states, the NAALC, and other
channels of labor cooperation in North America, broke down
considerably, and to date, the NAALC has not yet recovered.
What this chapter then shows is that in the absence of a
strong policy direction from any of the three states on how
to use the NAALC to develop areas for cooperation, and in
turn to strengthen labor rights protection in North
America, efforts at labor cooperation will remain stagnant,
even with a wide set of institutions available to promote
that cooperation.

9

Of course, most critics of the NAALC wish that it were more
adversarial, so that its enforcement capacity would be of more use,
but the states negotiated an agreement that kept the NAALC from
having a strong enforcement capacity (Buchanan and Chaparro 2008;
Weiss 2003). No state would have signed an agreement that had a
stronger capacity to punish labor rights violations because no state
wanted any other state to interfere in their labor laws or
practices. Mexico nearly withdrew from the entire agreement over
these very issues (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).
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